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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WHITNEY D. HA'MMOND,
Administrator of the Estate of
Jim Eskridge, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 8827

vs.
ZELPH S. CALDER,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
For brevity, defendant and appellant will hereinafter be referred to as Calder and plaintiff and
respondent will be called Hammond or Eskridge.
Hammond's brief recites many facts that cannot be substantiated by the record. To recite each
and every instance would make this reply brief too
long. However, at the bottom of Hammond's brief
page 2 he says that "on numerous occasions appellant (Calder) permitted his livestock to go upon
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the land farmed by the plaintiff without permission,
causing considerable damage to the crops growing
thereon.'' This is erroneous, and apparently designed
for the purpose to bolster up Eskridge's unfounded
su:It.
Calder's livestock was never upon the leased
ground of Eskridge while grain was growing thereon.
Eskridge's foreman insisted that Calder keep
his cattle off the leased ground entirely even though
the grain was harvested. This was in direct contravention of the terms of the lease granting Calder
all the grazing.
Hammond attempts to show at the bottom of
page 3 of his brief that he was appointed as an
ancillary administrator of the estate of Jim Eskridge, a non-resident and hence was not required
to file a non-residence cost bond. This is erroneous.
I:t will be noted that the widow of Jim Eskridge
filed a p~tition requesting that Whitney D. Hammond be appointed as administrator for the purpose only to further prosecute the case alre'ady filed
by her late husband, specifically alleging that the
estate had no other property in Utah. (R. 84) Thus
Whitney D. Hammond had authority only to act
as agent, trustee, or special administrator to further the case already instituted.
With respeCt to Calder's Point 1, plaintiff's
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failure to file a non-residence bond, the essential
facts are undisputed, that is: The trial court gave
Hammond 'an extension of time on November 15 to
file a non-residence cost bond. No such bond was
filed within the thirty days prescribed by the statutes. On December 17, Calder filed a Motion to
Dismiss. This case, as a matter of law, should have
ended here. No cost hond was ever filed.
Hammond seeks 'to excuse out of filing a cost
bond because he was a residence of Utah, growing
out of the fact that he was an ancillary administrator. 'This is not a case where the state becomes interested in unclaimed property of a non-resident requiring the appointment of an ancillary administrator. (See 2 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition 702).
If this court feels not to hold Calder on his
Point 1, then the stipulation entered into on June
26, 1956, set out in full, becomes an important
instrument for this court to examine.
The first question to be asked with respect to
Calder's Point 2 is whether or not that stipulation
makes provision for Calder to pay Eskridge's excess
wheat penalty which was imposed by the United
States Department of Agriculture about five months
later.
Hammond again goes outside the record a't
page 11 and 12 of his brief and attempts to show
3
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through lengthy conferences, (which did not occur),
'that Calder was blameworthy for the penalty being
imposed on the Eskridge wheat, because he harvested
some of Eskridge's volunteer wheat that was turned
to him on June 25.
Apparently Hammond is not familiar with the
U. S. D. A. 1956 Wheat Marketing Regulations (a
copy is herewith left with the record for the convenience of the court and counsel.)
Without considering the volunteer wheat acreage, there was planted about 100 acres in excess
of the wheat allotment of 436 acres, which was
mostly Eskridge's.
Hammond refused to cooperate with Calder
and plow up his pro rata share of planted wheat
to meet the acreage allotment. Hence he was the
blameworthy one.
Where the acreage is in excess, the production
of the wheat must also be in excess of the normal
yield as fixed by the U. S. D. A. for the Calder
farm before a penalty can be imposed. This could
ndt be determined until after the wheat was harvested. (See Sec. 72 P. 659, 1956 Wheat Marketing
Quota Regulations.)
A:t the time the stipulation was entered into
an extreme drouth exhis'ted. All indications pointed
to a wheat crop far less than the normal yield. How
4
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could this penalty be discussed when it was not
known until after harvest?
With respect to Calder's third point, does this
stipulation provide that Calder shall pay the cost
of plowing and preparing the ground for planting?
To follow the court's holding would unjus'tly enrich
Hammond. According to the U. S. D. A. measurement of the wheat after it was harvested, Eskridge
received 4,082 bushels from 350 acres of land. This
wheat was worth at that time in excess of $8,000.00.
On this basis, Eskridge would receive about $16,000.00 for 658 acres. All he would have had to do
would be to plant 'the grain and harvest i't, the cost
of which would not exceed $1.00 per acre for plarrting and $3.50 per acre for harvesting. Calder would
furnish the ground, pay the taxes, 'the in teres't on
the mortgage indebtedness, plow and prepare the
ground for seed; then, on top of that, pay Eskridge's
penalty on his own excess wheat of $1,129.00. Then
still further, give up his right to pasture the Eskridge stubble ground after harvest, for only 1;4 of
the wheat grown. Common share cropping leases
in the vicinity of Vernal are V2 to 'the land owner
·and Y2 'to the sharecropper.
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CONCLUSION
We submit as a matter of law this case shoulo
have been dismissed because of Hammond's failurE
to file a non-residence cost bond. That if this point
is not affirmed then we submit that it was error
for the tiral court to hold that the stipulation imposed Eskridge's excess wheat penalty of $1,129.00
upon Calder; that it was error for the trial court
to construe "clearing" in the stipulation as meaning
plowing and preparing for seed bed; that it was
error for the court to disimss Calder's claim for
removal of his granery and that it was error for
the trial court to impose costs against Calder.
Respectfully submitted,
ZELPH. S. CALDER
In Person
251 South 3rd West
Vernal, Utah
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I certify tha:t I mailed 2 copies of the foregoing
reply brief to Attorney Sterling D. Colton at 65
South Ma:in, Salt Lake City, Utah, on -----------------------19--------·
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